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INTRODUCTION 
The textual guarantees of economic and social rights are saturated by standards. Using 
the example from international law, the right to “an adequate standard of living”,1 to 
“adequate food, clothing and housing”,2 to variously targeted levels of education, and to 
“the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health”3, which are to be 
“progressively realized”4 subject to “maximum available resources”,5 all beg a kind of 
reasoned assessment of what might be considered adequate, appropriate, available, or 
∗ Associate Professor, Boston College Law School. With thanks to Vicki Jackson and Carlos Bernal for 
helpful comments on a previous draft. 
1 See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter ICESCR]. For commentary on the shared influence between human rights treaties and 
constitutional rights, see Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & Beth Simmons, Getting to Rights: Treaty 
Ratification, Constitutional Convergence, and Human Rights Practice, 54 Harv. Int’l L. J. 61 (2013). Yet 
evidence on the influences between international and constitutional economic and social rights indicates a 
far more idiosyncratic dynamic within different systems: see, e.g., Daniel M. Brinks, Varun Gauri & Kyle 
Shen, Social Rights Constitutionalism: Negotiating the Tension Between the Universal and the Particular, 
11 Ann. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. 289, 297-300 (2015). A focus on judicial methodology, rather than merely text 
and/or broader legal mobilization, is thus fruitful for economic and social rights.  
2 ICESCR, art. 11. 
3 Id., art. 11.  
4 Id., art. 12. 
5 Id., art 2(1). 
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attainable, in context. Less frequent, although certainly apparent, are the sorts of bright-
line rules that are said to make rights-adjudication and rights-enforcement a more 
constrained interpretive exercise.6 Even the negative obligations attached to economic 
and social rights, such as the prohibition against forced eviction,7 or denial of emergency 
medical treatment,8 may countenance some form of limitation, mediated by standards.9  
 
In this context, one would expect that the most disciplined sort of standards-based 
reasoning in rights adjudication – that of the sequenced and structured proportionality test 
or protocol, often named “proportionality analysis”10 – would have become prevalent for 
economic and social rights. For its proponents, proportionality analysis is integral to a 
new “global model of constitutional rights”,11 providing a “key to the door of an 
international community of judges”12 for disciplining and constraining the inevitable 
discretion opened up by rights adjudication and enforcement. If economic and social 
                                                
6 For a very useful articulation of this difference, in the American context, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, The 
Supreme Court, 1991 Term -- Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22-123 
(1992); for a more cross-doctrinal distinction between rights and principles, see ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 45-110 (2002). I discuss the parallels been conceptions of rules versus 
standards, and rights versus principles, in KATHARINE G. YOUNG, CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
RIGHTS 128 (2012). 
7 E.g., U.N. Committee on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 7: The right to 
adequate housing (Art.11.1): forced evictions; see also Sth. Afr. Const., § 26(3). 
8 E.g., U.N. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members 
of Their Families, art. 28; Sth. Afr. Const., § 27(3). 
9 For broader analysis of the different institutional instantiations of such limitations, see Young, supra note 
6, ch. 4. 
10 Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 Colum. 
J. Transnat’l L. 73 (2008). While I define proportionality analysis more fully in Part II, infra, it is worth 
stating at the outset that proportionality analysis typically follows a first stage of inquiry, in which a prima 
facie infringement of a right is demonstrated, and a second, in which the aims of the identified measure, 
and principles of its suitability, necessity, and balancing or proportionality in the narrow sense, are 
established. B. Schlink, Proportionality, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW (M. Rosenfeld & A. Sajo, eds., 2012) 721. See further text accompanying infra note 68. 
11 KAI MÖLLER, THE GLOBAL MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 277-314 (2012)  
12 MOSHE COHEN-ELIYA & IDDO PORAT, PROPORTIONALITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE (2013). 
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rights are part of that global model, a suggestion supported by recent empirical analysis,13 
there are numerous sites on which to establish the proportionality analysis. And yet, the 
comparative constitutional practice around economic and social rights reveals little 
resembling proportionality analysis, otherwise so “ubiquitous”14 in constitutional rights 
adjudication. Instead, the adjudication of economic and social rights integrates notions of 
proportionality in a seemingly indirect faction, through giving substance to standards of 
“reasonableness”,15 “appropriate measures”,16 and “progressive realization … according 
to maximum available resources”.17 These standards share with proportionality analysis 
the rejection of more content-driven, results-oriented, or rule-like conceptions of 
economic and social rights, such as the minimum core.18 But that rejection alone does not 
answer the question how proportionality, whether as principle or structured approach, 
relates to these new standards, particularly to that of reasonableness, a standard that now 
sets the framework for previously-absent international scrutiny on economic and social 
                                                
13 Courtney Jung, Ran Hirschl & Evan Rosevear, Economic and Social Rights in National Constitutions, 
610 Am. J. Comp. L. 1043 (2014) (counting a full third of constitutions, mainly from Latin America and 
Eastern Europe, and mainly from civil law jurisdictions, with justiciable economic and social rights 
guarantees.) 
14 MÖLLER, supra note 11. see Stephen Gardbaum, Positive and Horizontal Rights: Proportionality’s Next 
Frontier or A Bridge Too Far? in this collection.  
15 Grootboom, see infra Part I. 
16 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 9: The 
domestic application of the Covenant (UN doc. E/C.12/1998/24); Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (later reissued as UN document E/C.12/2000/13); see further Olivier 
De Schutter, Editor's Introduction to ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS 
(Olivier De Schutter, ed., 2013). 
17 ICESCR, art 2(1). 
18 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 3: The Nature 
of States Parties' Obligations, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990); see also Katharine G. Young, The 




rights.19 An identified “new aspect of the principle of proportionality”,20 described in the 
context of the massive reduction of social welfare protections across Europe in the wake 
of the global financial crisis, delinks proportionality as principle and proportionality 
analysis as a structured doctrine, and connects the principle of proportionality within 
broader standards of reasonableness.  
 
In this chapter, I examine the relationship between reasonableness review and 
proportionality within the context of economic and social rights. Both standards hew 
closely to the ideal of a “culture of justification”.21 Both too set out a measured 
assessment of the principle of proportionality, which we might summarize as the view 
that “the graver the impact of the decision upon the individual affected by it, the more 
substantial the justification that will be required.”22 Yet they do so under methodologies 
that are critically different. In outlining the differences of the two approaches, I present 
the developing approach to reasonableness review in South African constitutional law in 
Part I. The choice of this jurisdiction is pertinent as an early, sophisticated and influential 
                                                
19 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 8(4)), G.A. 
Res. 63/117, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/117 (Mar. 5, 2009) [hereinafter OP-ICESCR]. See I.D.G. v. Spain, 
Communication No. 2/2014, para 14. (UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights first 
answer to a complaint under the Optional Protocol, concluding that the Spanish Court did not take all 
reasonable measures to adequately notify the complainant of the impending application for mortgage 
enforcement).  
20  Xenophon Contiades & Alkmene Fotiadou, Social Rights in the Age of Proportionality: Global 
Economic Crisis and Constitutional Litigation, 10 INT’L J. CONSTITUTIONAL L. 660 (2012); David Bilchitz, 
Socio-economic Rights, Economic Crisis, and Legal Doctrine: A Rejoinder to Xenophon Contiades and 
Alkmene Fotiadou, 12 INT’L J. CONSTITUTIONAL L.710 (2014). 
21 Etienne Mureinik, Beyond a Charter of Luxuries: Economic Rights in the Constitution, 8 S. AFR. J. HUM. 
RTS. 464 (1992). 
22 For reference to this well-cited formula, from much comparative case law, see, e.g., Michael Taggart, 
Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbury, 2008 N.Z. LAW REV., 423, 433; Compare with the Law of 
Balancing expressed by Alexy: “The greater the degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, one 
principle, the greater must be the importance of satisfying the other”: ALEXY, supra note 6, at 102. 
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example of the reasonableness standard, which was forged by the court in the presence of 
both clearly enumerated and justiciable constitutional economic and social rights, and a 
structured limitations clause.23 In Part II, I contrast this approach with proportionality 
analysis, which has been deployed in civil and political constitutional rights cases in 
South Africa, but far fewer economic and social rights cases. In Part III, I discuss a more 
direct integration of proportionality into reasonableness review, and suggest what is 
gained, and what is lost, by this approach. A final question is whether reasonableness 
review, developed out of largely common law traditions, will travel as well as 
proportionality analysis purports to do.  
 I. REASONABLENESS REVIEW 
 
The South African Constitution provides a useful case study in which to evaluate the 
connections between reasonableness, proportionality and economic and social rights. 
With an expansive text,24 and the rights-promoting legacy of the anti-apartheid struggle,25 
the Constitutional Court’s approach to interpreting the constitutional rights to housing, 
health care, food and water, social security, and education has drawn a great deal of 
comparative attention. And if proportionality analysis jurisprudence is usually developed 
                                                
23 Sth. Afr. Const. §§ 26-29 (rights to housing, healthcare, food, water and social security, children’s rights, 
and education); § 36 (limitations of rights). 
24 Id.  
25 For analysis, see Karl E. Klare, Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism, 14 S. AFR. J. 
HUM. RTS. 146 (1998); THEUNIS ROUX, THE POLITICS OF PRINCIPLE (2013). 
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through the textual hook of a limitations clause,26 South Africa does not lack this 
feature.27 Yet the Constitutional Court has spearheaded a very different approach for 
economic and social rights adjudication, which now garners significant worldwide 
influence.28 
 
In the duly famed Grootboom decision,29 the first successful case under the constitutional 
guarantee of a right to housing, the South African Constitutional Court adopted, with 
attention to constitutional text,30 a particular standard for reviewing economic and social 
rights cases – the approach known as “reasonableness review”.31 This approach engages a 
means-end inquiry, but in a version distinctly more searching than mere “rationality 
review”.32 Like proportionality analysis, reasonableness review presses for a justification, 
in order to enhance the accountability of official decision makers and the transparency of 
their decisions. But it would be a mistake to see this test as merely the first two (or even 
                                                
26 Mattias Kumm, The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification: The Point of Rights-
Based Proportionality Review, 4 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 140 (2010). 
27 Sth Afr. Const. § 36. 
The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the 
extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including— 
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
28 See infra note 122 and accompanying text. 
29 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.) (‘Grootboom’). 
30 Sth. Afr. Const., § 26(2) (“The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right” for housing); see also § 27(2) 
(reasonable measures for healthcare, food, water and social security), § 29(1)(b) (reasonable measures for 
further education). 
31 For an extensive presentation and assessment of reasonableness review, see SANDRA LIEBENBERG, 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS: ADJUDICATION UNDER A TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTION 141 (2010). 
32 See Geo Quinot and Sandra Liebenberg, Narrowing the Band: Reasonableness Review in Administrative 
Justice and Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence in South Africa, in LAW AND POVERTY (Sandra 
Liebenberg & Geo Quinot, eds., 2012) 197. 
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final) prongs of proportionality analysis. 33  It is worth setting out the features of 
reasonableness review, and the early setting in Grootboom: a more-than-administrative, 
less-than-categorical, attention to the needs of the most vulnerable. 
 
First, the conception of reasonableness employed in South Africa is far greater than a 
traditional administrative law model of review. The relationship between reasonableness 
and administrative law has been much debated in this context, and requires an excursion 
into comparative administrative law. For, if proportionality can be said to have 
administrative law roots, even as it now resembles a central feature of global 
constitutionalism, 34 so too can the standard of reasonableness, but they are of English, 
rather than Continental, origin. That is, the review of reasonableness in administrative 
law emerged as a stronger incarnation of the very deferential administrative standard of 
Wednesbury review.35 That standard, which asked if the decision is so unreasonable that 
no decision maker could have made it, was a relaxed form of rationality review that could 
rarely defeat an administrative decision.  
 
Over time, Wednesbury began to heighten in intensity, with the courts identifying a 
general rule that “the graver the impact of the decision upon the individual affected by it, 
the more substantial the justification that will be required.”36 Prior to the enactment of the 
                                                
33 Cf. MÖLLER, supra note 11, at 179.   
34 Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 12; Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 10. 
35 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 (UK). 
36 Michael Taggart, Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbury, 2008 N.Z. LAW REV., 423, 433, citing Sir 
John Laws, "Wednesbury", in THE GOLDEN METWAND AND THE CROOKED CORD: ESSAYS ON PUBLIC LAW 
IN HONOUR OF SIR WILLIAM WADE (Forsyth & Hare eds., 1998) 185. 
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Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) (before proportionality analysis had made its leap to the 
British legal system via the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)), 
Wednesbury review had developed this more robust operation, in connection with a 
developing “human rights-consciousness infiltrat[ing] administrative law”, and 
equivalents were established in Anglo-Australasian public law.37 Ultimately, however, it 
was replaced in the UK, after the domestication of the ECHR, with the “more precise and 
more sophisticated” criteria of proportionality analysis, and its “somewhat greater” 
intensity of review.38  
 
In South Africa, where these developments were acknowledged and integrated,39 the 
reasonableness standard also received a new human rights-protecting orientation, via its 
development in the context of the Bill of Rights. Here, the standard represented a more 
radical departure from its Wednesbury origins. This was notable in relation to the 
developing administrative law jurisprudence, but also with respect to economic and social 
rights.40 When, in early commentary on Grootboom, Cass Sunstein celebrated the case’s 
                                                
37 Taggart, supra note 36, 432. 
38 Id. at 438; see R (on the application of Daly) v Sec. State for the Home Dept [2001] 2 AC 532 (HL), para 
27. Thus, held Lord Steyn, while “most cases would be decided in the same way whichever approach is 
adopted”, proportionality “may require the reviewing court to assess the balance which the decision-maker 
has struck, not merely whether it is within the range of rational and reasonable decisions”; and secondly, 
the test may go further than the assessment of relevant considerations, “inasmuch as it may require 
attention to be directed to the relative weight accorded to interests and considerations”. Id. See also Margit 
Cohn, Legal Transplant Chronicles: The Evolution of Unreasonableness and Proportionality Review of the 
Administration in the United Kingdom, 58 Am. J. Comp. L. 583 (2012). 
39 E.g., Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v. Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 S SA 490 (CC); Minister of 
Health v. New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2006 2 SA 311 (SA) para 108, with Chaskalson CJ noting that 
reasonableness under s 33(1) of the Sth Afr. Const. “is a variable but higher standard, which in many cases 
will call for a more intensive scrutiny of administrative decisions that would have been competent under 
the interim Constitution”. 
40 Quinot & Liebenberg, supra note 32, 202-3, 210-9. 
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“administrative law model” of economic and social rights adjudication,41 South African 
commentators pointed out its decidedly more robust role.42 The housing program at issue 
in Grootboom, for example, would have met the requirements of coherence and 
comprehensiveness at issue under Wednesbury,43 yet it failed to pass constitutional 
muster under the developing standard of reasonableness. This standard required, not only 
that a program implemented in order to realize an economic and social right be 
“coherent”,44 “balanced and flexible”,45 and “comprehensive and workable”,46 but even 
greater scrutiny. For example, the Court noted that a “program that excludes a significant 
sector of society cannot be said to be reasonable”.47 In particular,  
 
To be reasonable, measures cannot leave out of account, the degree and extent of 
the denial of the right they endeavour to realise. Those whose needs are most 
urgent and whose ability to enjoy all rights is therefore most in peril, must not be 
ignored by the measures aimed at achieving realisation of the right. It may not be 
sufficient to meet the test of reasonableness to show that the measures are capable 
                                                
41 CASS SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 234 (2001). 
42 E.g., Theunis Roux, Understanding Grootboom—A Response to Cass R. Sunstein, 12 CONST. F. 41, 46-
47 (2002). For continued warnings of the standard’s regression into this model, see, e.g., Danie Brand, The 
Proceduralisation of South African Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence, in RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN 
A TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTION 33 (H. Botha et al, eds, 2003); Stuart Wilson & Jackie Dugard, Taking 
Poverty Seriously: The South African Constitutional Court and Socio-Economic Rights, in LAW AND 
POVERTY, supra note 6, 222. 
43 Murray Wesson, Grootboom and Beyond: Reassessing the Socio-Economic Jurisprudence of the South 
African Constitutional Court, 20 S. Afr. J. Hum. Rts. 284, 291 (2004). 
44 Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.), para 41, 95. 
45 Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), para 43. 
46 Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), para 38, 40. 
47 Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), para 43. 
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of achieving a statistical advance in the realisation of the right. Furthermore, the 
Constitution requires that everyone be treated with care and concern.48 
 
This standard of reasonableness requires, then, all sectors to be catered for in any given 
policy directed to housing, health care, food, social security, or education, including the 
most vulnerable. 49 Due to the Constitutional Court’s attention to those in “crisis” 
situations,50 some have suggested that the standard requires a short-term, as well as long-
term, policy approach.51 Others have pointed to the focus on the values of dignity and 
equality undergirding reasonableness review in relation to economic and social rights.52 
But it is the focus on the needs of the most vulnerable that links the approach to a 
conception of constitutional rights with due attention to those “whose needs are most 
urgent”53 that directs our inquiry into its relationship with proportionality.  
 
The target of this analysis is not the “discrete and insular minorities”54 worthy of 
constitutional rights protection in the prominent U.S. model, which is based on a 
democratic justification of groups disproportionality underrepresented in political 
                                                
48 Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), para 44. 
49 Roux, supra note 42. 
50 Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at para. 43, 74. 
51 Wesson, supra note 43; cf. Roux, supra note 42 (no temporal priority). See also Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 
46 (CC) at para 43 (holding that a program must “make appropriate provision for attention to housing crises 
and to short, medium and long term needs”). 
52  Carol Steinberg, Can Reasonableness Protect the Poor? A Review of South Africa’s Rights 
Jurisprudence, 123 S. AFR. L.J. 264 (2006). 
53 Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.). See also City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v 
Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC) (concerning the rights of people in desperate 
need of housing who are subject to eviction from land by private landowners.). 
54 U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 US 144 (1938) (Justice Stone justifying “strict scrutiny” in cases in 
which legislation appears to be directed at ‘discrete and insular’ minorities, or groups of people who have 
historically been marginalised and subjected to prejudice.) 
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processes.55 Instead, a policy must not leave out those whose vulnerability is dictated by 
simple material need. This can include attention to the needs of the elderly, children, 
persons with disabilities, and female-headed households,56 but without a substantive (or, 
rather, court-driven) conception of the baseline of material provision that anyone cannot 
go without, or below.  
 
Thus, while Grootboom represented a significant elevation of the reasonableness 
standard, it is also notable in rejecting a stand-alone “minimum core” approach, which 
would establish a minimum threshold right to access housing, for example, or health 
care.57 While the adoption of the minimum core approach would not prevent an inquiry 
into justifiable limitations,58 its advocates have suggested that it creates a more rights-
supportive focus. 59  Yet in rejecting the minimum core as a standalone right, the 
Constitutional Court held open the possibility that the minimum core, understood as a 
                                                
55 Compare the seminal theorization by JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); with Bruce 
A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products. 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1985) (noting victims of sexual 
discrimination or poverty would have greater claim to Carolene Products’ concern, and yet not fall within 
the discrete, insular, or minority formulation). For a different set of criticisms of Carolene Products’ 
divisions, as against proportionality standards, see Vicki Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of 
Proportionality, in this volume (noting, in particular, Dandridge v. William, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting)). 
56 These factors are laid out in the Prevention of Illegal Evictions Act of 1998 (PIE Act) §§ 4, 6 (S. Afr.) 
and in the Court’s post-evictions jurisprudence since Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). For commentary, 
see Gustav Muller & Sandra Liebenberg, Developing the Law of Joinder in the Context of Evictions of 
People from their Homes, 29 S. AFR. J. HUMAN RTS. 554, 565 (2013).  
57 See Young, supra note 18, compare with DAVID BILCHITZ, POVERTY AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
(arguing for a minimum core approach for South Africa).  
58 Kevin Iles, Limiting Socio-Economic Rights: Beyond the Internal Limitations Clause, 20 S. AFR. J. 
HUM. RTS. 448 
59 E.g., Craig Scott & Philip Alston, Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A 
Comment on Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise, 16 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 206 
(2000), BILCHITZ, supra note 57. 
12 
 
relevant standard, could guide its assessment of reasonableness.60 Arguably, a compelled 
attention to the needs of the most vulnerable fosters the same attitude of priority-setting 
as the minimum core inquiry, without “entrenching” the judiciary’s own articulation of 
what the minimum core demands. Instead, an approach inflected with a focus on the 
experience of vulnerability (and what I shall describe as the inflection of proportionality), 
is provided. Before moving to describe this standard in Part III, I will outline the features 
of the proportionality analysis that has been influential in constitutional rights 
adjudication elsewhere. 
II. PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS 
 
Like reasonableness review, proportionality analysis provides a contextual standard for 
the judicial safeguarding of constitutional rights. Indeed, proportionality may be 
understood to be a subset of reasonableness – it has been counted among the leading 
manifestations of reasonableness in public law.61 For example, the rationality behind the 
means-end analysis of an official decision or statute, that is part of the reasonableness 
inquiry, could not sustain a grossly disproportionate result.62 Nonetheless, it is said to be 
proportionality analysis, rather than the principle of proportionality and its connection to 
                                                
60 Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), paras 31-33; See also Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 
(CC), paras 34-39; 
61 W. Sadurski, Reasonableness and Value Pluralism in Law and Politics, in REASONABLENESS AND LAW 
129, 133-4 (Giorgio Bongiovanni et al. eds., 2009); Iddo Porat, Some Critical Thoughts on Proportionality, 
in REASONABLENESS AND LAW. This volume shows a series of differing views on this relationship. 
62 AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS 371–78 (2012) 
(noting how “the marginal social importance of the benefits gained by achieving the law’s purpose have to 




rationality, that has purportedly swept the world.63 In this section, I provide a description 
of this test, and its limited application, so far, in economic and social rights adjudication. 
 
First, it is perhaps surprising that proportionality analysis, in the standard three or four-
step variation that has been utilized by so many contemporary courts,64 should be so 
absent from the adjudication of economic and social rights. If, in this era of “rights 
inflation”,65 we can talk about whether a right to feed pigeons exists, so too might it be 
expected that we can inquire about a right to secure a basic material existence – and about 
proportionality’s method for operationalizing it. Of course, for economic and social 
rights, and particularly the positive obligations that flow from them, much turns on the 
question of resources and then on how to understand a kind of “best efforts” 66 
institutional commitment in law. But if proportionality analysis is prescribed as the 
current answer to rights-induced juristocracy, due to its discipline and apparent 
consistency, 67 it is curious that it has had so little hold on the cases that raise the most 
persistent juristocratic fears. Yet, as will be shown in Part III below, the surprise relates 
only to the absence of proportionality analysis. The principle of proportionality, without 
the structured test, has found a home in economic and social rights adjudication. The 
                                                
63 Compare, e.g., MÖLLER, supra note 11, with DAVID BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW 160 (2004) 
(suggesting the principle boils down to the requirement of judges “to assess the legitimacy of whatever law 
or regulation or ruling is before them from the perspective of those who reap its greatest benefits and those 
who stand to lose the most”).  Beatty suggests that “the principle of proportionality and the idea of fair 
shares” grounds economic and social rights. Id. at 139. 
64 MÖLLER, supra note 11. 
65 Id. 
66 Frank I. Michelman, Socioeconomic Rights in Constitutional Law: Explaining America Away, 6 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 663 (2008). 
67 Porat, supra note 12, at 246; Dieter Grimm, Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional 
Jurisprudence, 57 U. Toronto L. J. 383 (2007), at 395.  
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reasonableness standard, which directs attention to the gravity of the need, and the 
vulnerability of the rights-holder, makes proportionality – as principle, but not as 
structured test – inseparable from reasonableness review.  
 
In its most widely defended theoretical exposition, proportionality analysis asks the 
following set of sequential questions (although there are somewhat different versions of 
this test68), once a prima facie infringement of a constitutional right has been found. (1) 
First, did the infringement further a legitimate aim? (2) Second, was the measure 
necessary? In the most rigorous version of this test, the measure is necessary if and only 
if there are no alternative, less restrictive means. (3) Third, do the benefits of the measure 
outweigh the costs imposed on the rights-bearer? This part introduces the balancing stage 
of the inquiry. 
 
This is the proportionality analysis that has apparently travelled from German 
administrative law to German constitutional law,69 to Canadian Charter jurisprudence,70 
to South Africa, New Zealand, Israel, Eastern Europe, and Central and South America, to 
the United Kingdom via Europe, and, of course,x to the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the European Court of Human Rights.71 In accompanying the rights revolution 
                                                
68 Compare e.g., Schlink, supra note 10 with Sadurski, supra note 61. 
69 Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 5; c.f. Lorraine Weinrib, The Postwar Paradigm and American 
Exceptionalism, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 83, 98-113 (Sujit Choudhry, ed., 
2006) (grounding the postwar constitutional paradigm in the Warren era of the United States Supreme 
Court.) 
70 R v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.). 
71 See, e.g., Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 10, 75; Cohn, supra note 38. The route has often been 
circuitous: see Nicholas Blake, Importing Proportionality: Clarification or Confusion [2002] EUROPEAN 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REPORTS 19, 23. 
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that prompted this migration, the test has both procedural and substantive appeal. Its chief 
German proponent, Robert Alexy, has provided a defense of proportionality analysis that 
argues that all rights can be optimized through the adoption of this assessment, rather 
than through a “firewall” of trumping or absolute protection.72  
 
Alexy’s model of proportionality is critically important for economic and social rights, 
because it integrates the question as to how the state’s duty to protect (as well as respect) 
rights can be subject to disciplined balancing.73 Nonetheless, despite the promise of this 
model for securing both the negative and the positive obligations that attach to economic 
and social rights, the deployment of the proportionality test has been largely 
asymmetrical in practice: it has mainly been reserved for “vertical” civil and political 
rights cases in their “negative” dimension.74 In part, this is because of the asymmetrical 
protection of economic and social rights in the constitutions or treaty systems that are the 
heaviest utilizers of proportionality analysis.75 But the South African example, which 
                                                
72 ALEXY, supra note 6. Cf. JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (1996), 258 (warning 
against a collapse of a constitutional firewall by irrational balancing). 
73 Robert Alexy, On Constitutional Rights to Protection, 3 Legisprudence 1, 13 (2009) (presenting the 
solution as a combination of proportionality with alternativity (which allows for alternatives in correcting 
an unconstitutional omission); see also BARAK, supra note 62, 422-434; MATTIAS KLATT & MORITZ 
MEISTER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF PROPORTIONALITY 85-108 (2012). 
74 MÖLLER, supra note 4, at 179.  
75 In the European Court of Justice, for example, the proportionality of a restriction on free movement 
rights, which conflicted with national laws aiming to uphold social rights, weighted heavily on one side of 
the ledger. See the controversial judgments in the Viking and Laval cases, where the rights of trade unions 
under Swedish law to engage in industrial action to seek improvements in working conditions was 
subordinated to the right of employers to “post” workers across border in line with EU freedom of labour 
rules: Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers Federation, Finnish Seamen’s Union v. Viking 
Line, 2007 E.C.R. I-10779; Case C-341/05, Laval un Parneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetafeforbudet, 
2007 E.C.R. I-11767; see also Colm O’Cinneide, Austerity and the Faded Dream of a “Social Europe”, in 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS AFTER THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 169, 192 (Aoife Nolan ed., 2014). 
See also the assessment of Canada’s s 1 jurisprudence in Martha Jackman & Bruce Porter, Socio-Economic 
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includes economic and social rights with so-called “internal” limitations clauses, and 
those without (for example, that no one may be evicted without an order from court; and 
that no one may be refused emergency medical treatment),76 has declined to integrate 
proportionality analysis in the adjudication of economic and social rights in all but two 
cases. Why is this so?  
 
The South African Constitutional Court has employed proportionality analysis for other 
constitutional rights.77  Indeed, it has relied on proportionality analysis to resolve some of 
the most dramatic rights controversies, starting with the early decision on the 
constitutionality of the death penalty.78 A structured limitations clause, borrowed from 
Germany via Canada, provides that any prima facie violations of rights proceed through a 
multi-factored proportionality analysis.79 The Constitutional Court, however, is not a 
strict adherent of the multipronged structure of the test: the Court considers the clause 
requires it to engage in “a balancing exercise and arrive at a global judgment on 
proportionality and not adhere mechanically to a sequential check-list”.80 Thus, while:  
 
As a general rule, the more serious the impact of the measure on the right, the 
more persuasive or compelling the justification must be … the question is one of 
                                                                                                                                            
Rights under the Canadian Charter, in SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 209 (Malcolm Langford, ed., 
2008). 
76 Sth. Afr. Const., §§ 26(3), 27(3).  
77 First National Bank v. Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
78 S v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (under interim Constitution). 
79 Sth. Afr. Const., § 36; cf. Interim Sth. Afr. Const. § 33 (retaining an essence formulation).  
80 S v. Manamela 2000 (3) SA 1 at para. 32; S v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at para. 104. 
Applying to final Constitution: National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v. Minister of 
Justice and Others 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para. 33–35. 
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degree to be assessed in the concrete legislative and social setting of the measure, 
paying due regard to the means which are realistically available in our country at 
this stage, but without losing sight of the ultimate values to be protected.81  
 
At the necessity stage, the Court has held that “when giving appropriate effect to the 
factor of “less restrictive means”, the court must not limit the range of legitimate 
legislative choice in a specific area.” For the Court recognizes that “such legislative 
choice is influenced by considerations of cost, implementation, priorities of social 
demands, and the need to reconcile conflicting interests.”82 
  
Such case law suggests that proportionality analysis has only loose appeal in other 
constitutional rights cases in South Africa, although the principle of proportionality itself 
is generally supported. And in only two economic and social rights cases – involving the 
right to housing and the right to social security – has the Court engaged in proportionality 
analysis. First, in Jaftha, the court held that where the state fails to honour its negative 
obligations with respect to the right to housing, the limitations analysis presented by s 36 
rather than the reasonableness inquiry of s 26(2) should be considered. In that case, the 
Magistrates’ Court Act’s permission of a sale in execution of a person’s home on the 
basis of failure to pay a “trifling debt” was held by the Constitutional Court to not be 
reasonable and justifiable, given the importance of access to adequate housing, its link to 
human dignity, the severity of the impact on indigent debtors, and the existence of less 
                                                
81 Manamela 2000 (3) SA 1 at para. 33. 
82 Id. at para. 49. 
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restrictive means of execution.83 This approach to proportionality involves a baseline 
assessment of the gravity of certain laws and policies on the most vulnerable, including 
the most economically vulnerable. 
 
Secondly, in Khosa, the Constitutional Court applied proportionality analysis to the 
state’s positive obligations, finding the exclusion of permanent residents from the 
government’s social assistance scheme constituted unfair discrimination and an 
unreasonable and unjustifiable limitation of the right to have access to social security.84 
In this case, proportionality analysis was triggered not by a negative obligation, but by 
the separate equality aspects of the claim. The exclusion was held to be both unfair 
discrimination (§ 9, unjustifiable under § 36) and an infringement of the requirement to 
take reasonable measures to progressively realize the right of access to social security 
(§27(2)). The Court left open the possibility that the inquiry into reasonableness under the 
two constitutional provisions could constitute separate tests. 85  Observers have 
hypothesized that there may be different kinds of justifications at stake between the 
reasonableness inquiry that is established for the positive obligations under economic and 
social rights, and the approach to reasonableness within the proportionality analysis of 
the general limitations clause:  
 
 Whereas § 27(2) appears to limit our considerations to those justifications related 
to the means required to realize the purpose of the right (e.g., money) or the end 
                                                
83 Jaftha v Schoeman 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) at paras. 35–49. Compare §26(2); § 36. 
84 Khosa v. Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC).  
85 Id. at para. 84.  
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of the right itself (e.g., social security), § 36 tells us that we may cast our 
justificatory nets as far as the needs of an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality, and freedom will allow.86 
 
Yet the Constitutional Court itself has declined to endorse any distinction between the 
two approaches. It is worth examining the differences in the approaches to 
proportionality analysis and reasonableness review. 
   III. DISTINGUISHING THE TWO APPROACHES 
 
Proportionality and reasonableness may be analytically similar in the way they heighten 
the demand for justification according to the seriousness of the rights infringement; but 
their methodologies are critically distinct. There are three main differences: first, in the 
interpretation of the claimed right; second, in the approach to deference; and third, in the 
structuring of the limitation. These differences are outlined below, before turning to the 
question of how much turns on them, in actual practice.  
 
A. The Content Inquiry 
 
First, proportionality analysis and reasonableness review are distinct in the latitude they 
provide to judges in interpreting the claimed-for right. This is a consequential matter for 
                                                
86 Stu Woolman & Henk Botha, Limitations, in Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd ed, Original 
Service June 2008), 34.3-34.5.  
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economic and social rights, which are less developed, jurisprudentially, than their civil 
and political counterparts, highlighting a “paucity of normative resources on which the 
Court can draw in the interpretation of socio-economic rights or a clear purposive 
understanding of a transformative role of the Court in relation to socio-economic 
inequality”.87    
 
Under proportionality analysis, the rights-granting clause is construed generously in favor 
of the claimant, who bears the onus of proving an infringement has occurred. Once made 
out, the onus of justification then shifts to the state. This general principle of construction 
accords readily with the observation of “rights-inflation” that is associated with 
proportionality more generally. In theory, a generous construction would lead to a broad 
acceptance of rights to access housing, health care, food, water, or education. One 
proponent of proportionality has suggested “the highest reasonable satisfaction” of the 
right in question could serve as the prima facie right.88 
 
In contrast, under the present operation of reasonableness review, the interpretation of the 
right’s content is collapsed in an incremental, and context-driven inquiry. The 
Constitutional Court has interpreted the constitutional text as setting out no standalone 
                                                
87 Dugard & Wilson, supra note 42, 229 (comparing this with “several centuries of history and a rich array 
of jurisprudence across a host of jurisdictions”; Young, supra note 6 (discussing the “generational” idea 
between the different categories of rights).  
88 Carlos Bernal, The Constitutional Adjudication of Positive Social and Economic Rights by Means of the 
Proportionality Analysis, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROBERT ALEXY (Martin Borowski, Stanley Paulson and 
Jan R. Sieckmann, eds., forthcoming) (proposing a standard of “highest reasonable level of satisfaction” to 
give content to the right.); Cf. Moller (discussing the steps involved in finding a right to feed pigeons). 
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right that is separately articulated, before reasonableness is applied.89 By integrating the 
analysis of a right’s progressive realization, within the state’s available resources, in the 
same step as defining the right, there is no standalone content, inflated or otherwise. 
Thus, this form of review does little to outline the scope of the right, even while it may 
require proof from government that it has engaged in reasonable priority setting. Partly, 
this is because of the Court’s insistence that it will not recognize a self-standing 
“minimum core” of economic and social rights.90 But partly, this is due to the Court’s 
reluctance to set any baseline entitlement or standard, outside of the legislative or 
common law context arising in each case.91 This general approach is also compatible with 
the features of weak-form review applicable to South Africa, as elsewhere.92 
 
Although the distinction is not used in South Africa, this way of defining content is more 
akin to setting out an institutional guarantee, enclosed in the garb of a justiciable, 
subjective right. Such an approach has the advantage of keeping the right open to new 
claims and articulations; nevertheless, it allows the court to obscure its own engagement 
with the underlying values behind particular rights and the impact of the deprivation on 
                                                
89 Compare i.e. § 26(1) and 26(2); see further Iles, supra note 58. 
90 See supra text accompanying note 57. 
91 See, e.g., A.J. Van der Walt’s suggested principle of “subsidiarity”, which requires that “direct 
application of the Constitution and the application and development of the common law should only come 
up in the absence of legislation …. [L]egislation either fails constitutional scrutiny or triggers a subsidiarity 
principle according to which the right must primarily be protected via the legislation and not via direct 
application of the constitutional provision or the common law: A.J. Van der Walt, Normative Pluralism and 
Anarchy, 1 CONST. CT. REV. 77, 108 (2008); see also Brian Ray, Evictions, Aspirations and Avoidance, 
CONST. CT. REV. 7 (2015). 
92 MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2008); STEPHEN GARDBAUM, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH MODEL 
OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE (2013).  
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the claimant group.93 For its critics, this refusal to define content allows reasonableness 
review to take place in “a normative vacuum”:94 a criticism made more resonant after the 
minimal standard of reasonableness applied in recent cases.95 In Mazibuko, for example, 
the Constitutional Court was required to assess whether Johannesburg’s reforms for 
providing water to Soweto residents, which allocated a minimum quota of free water and 
a new pre-paid metered delivery system, were consistent with the constitutional right to 
have access to water. In applying a highly deferential standard of reasonableness, the 
court refused to engage in the question of what a minimum requirement of water might 
be, despite evidence that the 8 kilolitre monthly quota would be too meagre for many 
households. It is worth questioning whether proportionality might have changed the 
court’s position in this determination. Below, I offer reasons as to why the principle of 
proportionality itself, and yet not proportionality analysis, would have assisted in this 
inquiry.  
 
It is possible that the context-driven articulations of reasonableness can link the standard 
of review to the remedy. This is the case, for example, in doctrines such as “meaningful 
engagement” in the right to housing jurisprudence. The absence of a meaningful 
engagement between the parties, before an eviction, can point to the unreasonableness of 
government policy. But so, too, can meaningful engagement be prescribed as the remedy, 
                                                
93 LIEBENBERG, supra note 31 at 175–76.  
94 Bilchitz, supra note 57, at 143. 
95 Mazibuko 2010 (3) BCLR 239; see also Nokotyana v. Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2010 (4) 
BCLR 312.   
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thus linking the two analyses,96 in ways that may be less immediately obvious in 
proportionality analysis.  
 
The divergence on the two approaches to interpreting the right becomes less sharp if one 
recognizes economic and social rights as principles, and there is nothing within the 
reasonableness assessment that prevents an open and broad statement of content before 
proceeding to the reasonableness inquiry. Nonetheless, the omission of this step has 
consequences for its placement of the burden of proof in rights adjudication. As a general 
matter, it is for the applicant to establish the breach of a fundamental right. Under 
proportionality analysis, the burden then shifts to the government to justify its prima facie 
infringement of the relevant right;97 in reasonableness review, it may remain with the 
claimant, a not-insignificant barrier.98 
 
These differing approaches to content are also distinct in relation to the minimum core 
idea. Certainly, reasonableness review may accommodate conceptions of a minimum 
threshold as one in a series of criteria that the Court will consider.99 In contrast, the effect 
of the minimum core on the exercise of proportionality analysis is to minimize the right 
at both stages of the inquiry: in forming content and in justifying limitations. Although 
                                                
96 For the importance of linking review with remedy, see Katharine G. Young, A Typology of Economic and 
Social Rights Adjudication, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1 (2011). 
97 Makwanyane, para 6; see also Woolman & Botha, supra note 86, 34.6. 
98 The degree to which this burden extends across §§ 26(2) and 27(2) is uncertain. See the analysis of 
Sandra Liebenberg, Interpretation of Socio-Economic Rights, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA 
(2nd ed, OS, December 2003), 33-53 (suggesting that “the party claiming a constitutional violation would 
have to establish a prima facie case that the measures undertaken are unreasonable” but that “[i]f the state 
wishes to rely on a lack of available resources … it should bear the burden of proving the alleged 
unavailability of resources”). 
99 Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC). 
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there is evidence of an effective operation of the minimum core and proportionality 
analysis in relation to economic and social rights in the Colombian context,100 it is easy to 
theorize that the combination of approaches would both remove the inflationary effects of 
proportionality analysis at the expense of rights perhaps most in need of an inclusive, 
solidaristic expression, and deprive economic and social rights of operation in any but 
grave or catastrophic circumstances.101  
B. The Approach to Deference 
 
Second, the approaches to proportionality and reasonableness differ in the approach to 
deference, such as the margin of appreciation used in proportionality analysis or the 
context-based criteria applied in reasonableness review. In each of these approaches, the 
underlying problematic is the separation of powers problem common to all positive 
obligations flowing from economic and social rights: too little deference causes the court 
to usurp the democratically elected branches; too much abdicates the responsibility 
undergirding judicial review.102  
 
Under reasonableness review, deference is bound up with the content inquiry, discussed 
above, where the right is given an interpretation generous to the government’s (or other 
                                                
100 David Landau, The Promise of a Minimum Core Approach: The Colombian Model for Judicial Review 
of Austerity Measures, in ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS AFTER THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS, 267, 284. 
Landau suggests that the Colombian Constitutional Court favors the vital minimum, or minimum core, as a 
concept in which to prioritize the interests of the poor, and proportionality analysis as a subsequent step in 
comparing the limitation with the government’s justification. 
101 Cf. Bernal, supra note 88. Using the Hartian vocabulary of cores and penumbras, Barak offers the view 
that proportionality should be applied to the full scope, but the core is a useful accompanying concept: 
BARAK, supra note 62, 20.   
102 For an apt description of this general problem, see Michelman, supra note 66. 
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actor’s) discretion.103 Under proportionality analysis, on the other hand, deference is 
provided through the application of a margin of appreciation or discretion, particularly in 
order to deal with the threat of judicial usurpation represented by a “less restrictive 
means” analysis, as applied to positive obligations. For example, the cost savings of a 
measure restrictive of a right to health care, or housing, for example, may be viewed, 
without deference, as trivial by a court (and therefore not necessary) or as capable of 
being shifted or offset by other aspects of the budget (and therefore not the least 
restrictive means).104 Other cases susceptible to a “dollars versus rights” frame may push 
too closely on both epistemic and democracy based limitations.105 Hence, the “self-
restraining reaction”106 of deference is triggered on the part of the court. And like other 
“containment” doctrines,107 the general posture of deference, or a margin of appreciation, 
immediately defeats the rigor (and consistency) of the inquiry in the first place. 
 
This dynamic is not surprising. For proportionality proponents, for example, positive 
obligations are the quintessential area for affording deference, and the belief that the 
                                                
103 E.g., Mazibuko, and criticisms, LIEBENBERG, supra note 31. Reasonableness review integrates discretion 
to lower courts, in, e.g., horizontal application, or even the epistemic discretion required for science: see, 
e.g., Treatment Action Campaign.  
104 See, e.g., the Canadian cases of Eldridge [1997] 3 SCR 624 and Gosselin v. Quebec (A.G.) [2002] 4 
SCR 429 (dissent). For a recent acknowledgement that budgets will be within the purview of 
reasonableness analysis, see Blue Moonlight 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC) para 74 (Sth. Afr.) 
105 E.g., Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. N.A.P.E. [2004] 3 SCR 381. (Canadian Supreme Court passing 
through every stage of proportionality before finding that a burden on pay equity was justifiable in the 
context of a fiscal crisis).  
106 Contiades & Fotiadou, supra note 20. 
107 For a broader outline of “containment” doctrines, see Colm O’Cinneide, The Constitutionalization of 
Social and Economic Rights, in SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 261 (Helena 
Alviar García et al. eds., 2015) (as designed to limit the “spillover” of civil and political rights protection 
and administrative law controls into the social and economic realm).  
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legislature’s own balancing is worthy of respect.108 But this is, of course, based on the 
assumption that the legislature has accorded due respect to economic and social rights, to 
which it is held democratically accountable – assumptions that may hold in the traditional 
welfare states, in so-called “normal” circumstances of stability and solidarity, but are far 
less tenable in conditions of fiscal disruption and crisis, ideological disagreement, 
legislative dysfunction, and internationally controlled fiscal policy – conditions which are 
far more likely to hold, in most places.109  
 
Given the inevitability of this dynamic, it is curious that proponents of proportionality 
have not reached a more developed position on where, when, and how, deference should 
be applied.110 The correct level can depend, according to Mattias Kumm, on such broad 
factors as the political, social and cultural context; the complexity of the policy questions 
involved, the structure of the processes and institutions that have generated the decision 
that is under review, and the structure of the judicial institution.111 Most of these factors 
would be weighted towards the adoption of deference in economic and social rights 
review. Even the negative obligations that flow from economic and social rights – such as 
obligations to desist from unlawful evictions, when homelessness may result – can raise 
                                                
108 ALEXY, supra note 6. 
109 See, e.g., how these assumptions are treated by so-called “activist” tribunals in South Africa, Colombia, 
and India: CONSTITUTIONALISM OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH (Daniel Bonilla Maldonado ed., 2013).  
110 For a call for “a clear principled basis for deference” in relation to the necessity enquiry, see David 
Bilchitz, Necessity and Proportionality: Towards A Balanced Approach? in REASONING RIGHTS: 
COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT 41, 48 (Liora Lazarus et al. eds., 2014). But see Matthias Klatt & 
Johannes Schmidt, Epistemic Discretion in Constitutional Law, 10 Int’l J. Const’l L. 69, 71 (2012) (seeking 
to outline an approach to discipline what they term as “the discretion of classification”).  
111 Kumm, supra note 51, at 163.  
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issues of complexity, such as how, and in what form, alternative accommodation should 
be provided. 
 
For Julian Rivers, the intensity of review can be shifted, between stronger and weaker, 
and more or less deferential forms of proportionality analysis, according to the 
“seriousness of the infringement” at issue.112 But how is this seriousness to be determined 
by a court? Here, proportionality analysis runs out. For if courts do take economic and 
social rights seriously – and inquire into the dignity, equality, or freedom harms caused 
by the failure to secure basic needs or capabilities – then deference would immediately be 
put to one side, forcing the courts into a rigorous and searching proportionality analysis. 
More likely, as current evidence suggests, courts will revert to recognizing “property-
based” or “equality” based assessments of seriousness, which are more cognizable to 
them, rather than attempt to accord due weight to the inevitable dignity harms that are 
experiencing by those living in poverty or other forms of vulnerability.113 
 
We might well accept judicial deference, via the margin of appreciation or other 
containment doctrines, or via the standard of reasonableness, under traditional separation 
of powers principles. There is much at stake in courts involving themselves in a highly 
                                                
112 Julian Rivers, Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review, 65 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 174 (2006). 
113 An interesting outcome of this tendency to judge seriousness through available categories is the middle 
class bias that flows from according less deference in such cases. Compare, for example, the South African 
Constitutional Court’s refusal to recognize a right to water for Soweto residents who were unable to pay, 
with its recognition of a right to electricity for those who had paid but were disconnected: Mazibuko, supra 
note 95, with Joseph v. City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC). Others too have suggested that such 
rights can “degenerate into consumer rights that are hijacked by the middle and upper classes”: e.g., Daniel 




charged balancing exercise, involving the complex weighting of principles of distributive 
justice, while maintaining a pragmatic grasp on their own legitimacy. Yet this dynamic 
does question the justification for proportionality analysis based on its purported 
disciplining effect. This is because if nothing within proportionality analysis dictates 
whether the court inquires more or less searchingly to the questions it asks at each stage, 
or how it should provide a margin of appreciation, then its claims to discipline and 
coherence are weakened.114 The approach is then, in this respect, on par with the less 
explicit deference applied in reasonableness review.115 
 
C. The Structure of Limitations 
 
Finally, the approaches to proportionality and reasonableness differ in their structuring of 
the limitation inquiry. As described above, proportionality analysis offers a disciplined, 
regimented, structured inquiry into the aims, necessity, (sometimes suitability) and 
proportionality of a limitation of a right. In this respect, it calls for the least (or sometimes 
merely less116) restrictive alternative. Even if these tests are not strictly observed in South 
Africa, the sequence represents a higher order of justification. Reasonableness, on the 
other hand, provides a holistic, general question, incorporating notions of necessity, 
                                                
114 While a full engagement with these arguments is beyond the scope of this chapter, one does not need to 
adopt the wholesale legal realism of Mark Tushnet, Easy Cases Make Hard Law, in this volume, to 
question the guarantee of certainty in the proposal of Klatt & Schmidt, supra note 110. 
115 For the suggestion that South African judges are averse to deference, due to the apartheid legacy, see 
Hugh Corder, From Despair to Deference: Same Difference?, in INSIDE AND OUTSIDE CANADIAN 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF DAVID MULLAN (Huscroft & Taggart eds., 2006) 327, 328. 
116 Sth. Afr. § 36 (1)(e) (a reasonable and justifiable limitation is measured against a number of factors, 
including the availability of any “less restrictive means to achieve the purpose”.) 
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suitability and proportionality in an ad hoc method, which is arguably less restraining of 
the adjudicator’s own views.  
 
Again, the example of Mazibuko demonstrates the destructuring of the proportionality 
step within reasonableness review: in finding Johannesburg’s water reforms to be 
reasonable, the court did not consider whether the City’s objectives – “to reduce 
unaccounted for water, to rehabilitate the water network, to reduce water demand and to 
improve the rate of payment”117 could have been pursued through other, less restrictive 
alternatives. For example, the Constitutional Court did not consider whether the City’s 
objectives might have been achieved through installation of conventional credit meters 
(which would not result in automatic shutoffs); or whether a more generous quota applied 
overall would be more cost-effective than keeping an indigent person’s register, given 
that the City’s representative had indicated that the universalist system would be cheaper 
to administer.118 In this respect, the structure of proportionality analysis might force the 
adjudicator to engage more explicitly with the more rights-respecting alternatives. So too 
may a more explicit adoption of the proportionality principle, without the requirement of 
deference. 
   IV. PROPORTIONALITY-INFLECTED REASONABLENESS? 
                                                
117 Mazibuko 2010 (3) BCLR 239 at para. 13. 
118 See, e.g., Anashri Pillay & Murray Wesson, Recession, Recovery and Service Delivery: Political and 
Judicial Responses to the Financial and Economic Crisis in South Africa, in ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
RIGHTS AFTER THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 100, at 352. 
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In celebrating proportionality analysis, commentators have suggested that it can provide a 
“flexible, but generally more substantive interpretation of positive rights, avoiding both 
the Scylla of a minimum core approach and the Charybdis of a mere reasonableness 
test”.119 Yet South African commentary suggests a different operation of proportionality: 
“proportionality-inflected reasonableness”, as a compromise position. This approach 
addresses the concerns of weakness within reasonableness review, while avoiding the 
self-defeating containment doctrines that limit the reach of proportionality in economic 
and social rights cases, especially those involving positive obligations. A greater attention 
to the excessive impacts on rights experienced by the most vulnerable allows for a more 
robust integration of the principle of proportionality into economic and social rights 
review.  
 
Nonetheless, the question remains as to whether a proportionality-inflected 
reasonableness travels well, beyond our setting of South African constitutional law. Just 
as the comparative lessons of economic and social rights adjudication is that standards-
based, apparently weak-form adjudicatory postures can (perversely) produce more rights-
protective results than strong form, muscular or managerial adjudication;120 the other 
lesson is its contingency. The ability of weak-form review to deliver positive outcomes 
can depend on a series of contextual factors, including legal or constitutional culture; 
function or dysfunction on the part of the executive and legislature (and public 
perceptions of the same); vitality and clout of rights-claiming social movements and civil 
                                                
119 KLATT & MEISTER, supra note 73, 108. 
120 Tushnet, supra note 92. 
31 
 
society;121 and even timing of jurisprudential development.122 In the setting of economic 
and social rights, it is difference, rather than uniformity, that marks the comparative 
setting.123 
 
Yet proportionality-inflected reasonableness has already been a successful transplant in 
economic and social rights review. The success of Grootboom influenced the drafting of 
the new Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights.124 In the face of heated contestation of alternatives – such as setting out a 
standard of “unreasonableness”, or providing for a “margin of appreciation” or “margin 
of discretion”, the new OP-ICESCR requires the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights to consider “the reasonableness of the steps taken by the State Party”, 
bearing in mind “that the State Party may adopt a range of possible policy measures” for 
                                                
121 YOUNG, CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS, supra note 6; CÉSAR RODRÍGUEZ-GARAVITO & 
DIANA RODRÍGUEZ-FRANCO, RADICAL DEPRIVATION ON TRIAL: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON 
SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH (2015).  
122 Sandra Fredman has called for proportionality to be applied in UK positive rights cases, partly for fear 
that reasonableness review will devolve into Wednesbury analysis in that setting: Fredman, New Horizons: 
Incorporating Socio-economic rights in a British Bill of Rights, [2010] PUBLIC LAW 297, 317.  
123 Colm O’Cinneide, The Problematic of Social Rights – Uniformity and Diversity in the Development of 
Social Rights Review, in REASONING RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT 299 (Liora Lazarus et 
al. eds., 2014); Brinks et al, supra note 1. 
124 Brian Griffey, The ‘Reasonableness’ Test: Assessing Violations of State Obligations under the Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 11 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
275 (2011); see also Note prepared by the Secretariat, ‘The Use of the ‘‘Reasonableness’’ Test in 
Assessing Compliance with International Human Rights Obligations’, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/WG.4/CRP.1 
(Feb. 1, 2008) (use of “reasonableness” in nine core human rights treaties); Bruce Porter, Reasonableness 
and Art. 8(4), in THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND 
CULTURAL RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY (Malcolm Langford et al, eds,. forthcoming).  
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implementing its obligations.125 Perhaps the Anglo-common law heritage of the standard 
helped to assuage the hostility of the main opponents of a complaints mechanism.126 
 
In outlining the scope of  “reasonableness”, the Committee has largely adopted the South 
African approach, including whether the steps have “taken into account the precarious 
situation of disadvantaged and marginalized individuals or groups and, whether they were 
non-discriminatory, and whether they prioritized grave situations or situations of risk”.127 
It has also made an explicit reference to proportionality, noting that it will consider to 
which extent, “ where several policy options are available, the state party has adopted the 
option that least restricts Covenant rights”.128  The likely consolidation of national 
jurisprudence within the complaints mechanism will give greater migratory flight to the 
reasonableness standard for diverse constitutional systems.129  
 
While the constraints on an international treaty body are different from a constitutional 
court, there are cross-fertilizations back and forth in the standards and forms of review. In 
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High Commissioner, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Status of 
Ratification, (Mar. 30, 2016), http://indicators.ohchr.org/ [https://perma.cc/CR5E-VUHJ]. On local 
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the European setting, the links between reasonableness and integrated proportionality will 
no doubt continue. For example, in a letter to Member States addressing the global 
financial crisis, the Committee confirmed the “requirement” of proportionality, by calling 
for all policies confronting the crisis to “be necessary and proportionate, in the sense that 
the adoption of any other policy, or a failure to act, would be more detrimental to 
economic, social and cultural rights.” 130  A proportionality-inflected standard of 
reasonableness may draw from the relevant examples from Europe, which include the 
Latvian Court’s rejection of social security reforms made in the absence of “objective and 
well-weighted analysis” of the economic and social consequences of the reforms, and of 
other less restrictive means.131 Similarly, in Hungary, among the Constitutional Court’s 
earliest cases was a holding that the citizen’s legitimate expectations and confidence in 
the legal system required a serious consideration of different means to social security 
reform, and not merely application of reforms “practically overnight”.132 A recent 
addition to this line of examples is the well-known rejection, by the German 
Constitutional Court, of cuts to social security reached by a random, rather than evidence-
based, inquiry.133  
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In other contexts, too, the requirement to give “reasonable consideration” to 
constitutional requirements may be more or less open to the principle of proportionality. 
For example, there is evidence that the pressure for a reasonable formulation of budgets 
has contributed to public debate about the appropriate level of educational spending in 
Indonesia.134 Pressure to accommodate state education rights in the United States has 
informed the public discourse about taxing and spending in the United States, allowing a 
democratic conversation about short-term fiscal efficiency to be broadened by 
considering rights-based constitutional commitments.135  
 
Nonetheless, many of the constitutional systems protective of justiciable economic and 
social rights do not share the South African tradition of an evolving reasonableness 
review; and those common law systems that do, have often failed to incorporate 
economic and social rights. Civil law systems are more than five times as likely to have 
incorporated justiciable constitutional rights than common law systems, including the 
non-English language jurisdictions within Latin America and Eastern Europe.136 It may 
be likely that proportionality analysis, alongside the margin of appreciation, has taken, or 
will take, greater hold in such systems; and that innovations in its application will 
follow.137  
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The operation of proportionality is an asymmetrical one in the so-called “global model” 
of constitutional rights – it is a test that has not been invoked in the prominent economic 
and social rights cases usually associated with this model. Partly, this is because the 
“margin of appreciation” that attends a proportionality inquiry is more likely to be 
triggered under present conceptions of economic and social rights. Nonetheless, the 
proportionality principle – that “the graver the impact of the decision upon the individual 
affected by it, the more substantial the justification that will be required” – inflects the 
standard of reasonableness that has been developed for economic and social rights 
adjudication. This paper suggests that the reasonableness standard, which follows a 
methodology of contextualized rights-evaluation, rather than the separate rights-
identification and justification-of-limits associated with the proportionality test, can 
nevertheless be both protective, and constraining, of justiciable rights. By avoiding the 
“containment” doctrines that can effectively remove all strength from a purportedly 
stronger intensity of review, the use of a proportionality-inflected reasonableness may yet 
deliver greater rights protection. 
